A Praetorian Tradition Part II
by Manuel L. Quezon III
In a letter dated July 16, 1940, Gen. Vicente Lim made his
political views, based on his military perspective, clear. He wrote, "The principal defect of
our national defense is not the training or lack of finances, but the great
and dangerous defect of democracy which has been implanted into the minds of
the Filipino people. We have a nationally wrong conception of democracy. Our
democracy in the Philippines is unilateral. It is only for the benefit, for
the freedom, for the rights, comfort and happinness of each individual member
of the nation. That is the common beleif, and I venture to say 99.9% of our
people beleive in that kind of democracy. They do not know their obligations,
their duties, and the sacrifices that they should give to the state which is
the relative counterpart of the amount of personal democracy he should
indulge. The two should balance. We do not have yet in the minds of our
people the thought that in order to enjoy the spirit of democracy they should
give their lives and property to the state..."
Two days later he would write (in another letter) "I would rather
work in a
Philippines half-way being totalitarian than on complete democracy which is
misinterpreted by 99% of our people." He was not alone in this view at a time
when Malacanang was advocating "partyless democracy," (which would mutate
into Marcos's "constitutional authoritarianism") and other leaders like Jose
P. Laurel, who also felt Filipinos had become soft, urged Filipinos to adopt
the principles of bushido . Of course corruption was the first sign of this
"softness," including corruption in the military of the 1930's which made
Gen. Lim sick, particuarly in one case where an officer was court-martialed
and would have been exonerated despite the evidence, if Lim hadn't
intervened. It was bad enough that "the esprit de corps which had been handed
down to us that right or wrong we should protect our comrades." Lim wrote. He
felt it would take 20 years to put the military on a sound footing.
That is, if outside interference was avoided. Imagine the fate of
the army
if it were politicized! As he wrote on July 23, 1941, "I have been saying
without any mental reservation or equivocation on my part, that the thing to
do to preserve this nation is to keep the army out of politics. But they do
not seem to believe it, even Quezon. He believes in the idea but not in
practice, and there is a great difference between believing and that of
acting. I have more faith in our future generation to build this army up
than the present generation to eradicate the evil. I hope the graduates we
produce from the Military Academy and those who graduate from the two
academies in the States will be able to change this army in the next 25
years... the minute you put in favorites, relatives, and compadres, then this
army will bring down the government."
What is interesting about this observation of his is the fact that the
military mentality is so distinct. However Gen. Lim's views are not the
glimmerings of today's National Security Doctrine, espoused by the RAM and
Gen. Almonte. True enough, the frustrations which made Lim dream of reform
eventually led the young officers to agitate for reforms; but they went
further: the young officers of Gringo's generation decided the military
itself ought to become the governing power, to save the nation from
politicians. Lim's obsession was the creation of an efficient army, not the
transformation of the state. He was even skeptical about military service
requirements, which bears study considering the current proposal to
de-legislate CMT and ROTC, which have existed since Lim's time.
May 6, 1939: "I told the President that I am sorry that I do not
concur with
General MacArthur's plan of [the army] taking care of the citizenship
training of the youth of the land and that we are going again in the wrong
direction as I still beleive that the training of the youth really belongs to
the homes, the churches, the schools and other institutions, like the Boy
Scouts and Girl Scouts." Lim had written earlier, on March 28, that "in 1934,
a year before the insuguration of the Commonwealth... I set forth three
fundamentals under which our Army should be built... first, the citizenship
training; second the physicial development; and third: the education along
military lines." Lim felt the Army had no business meddling in the first and
second stages.
(Incidentally, ahead of Fallows, Gen. Lim came up with his own
version of a
"damaged culture" in his letter of July 16th: "We speak of nothing but our
own rights, our own freedom. The government is corrupt because it is in the
blood of the Filipino. It gives him quite a spirit of satisfaction and
happiness to be able to mislead anyone; it is in the blood and to tell a lie
is nothing but a happiness to him because it was the line of least resistance
for the accomplishment of a certain end. He lacks that civic courage to
suffer any defeat on any enterprise and he solves the problem the easiest way
possible -by cheating or misleading to his goal.")
It is tragic to see how views like General Lim's developed, in
other minds,
into the adventurist and alarming mentality of officers who consider
themselves a praetorian guard, willing and able to "save the nation" from
itself. Lim had also written that "This Army... to the public is a joke.We
have made much bombastic propaganda to stir up the spirit to the cause of
national defense. We have built castles in the air for the consumption of the
public." This view apparently holds true to this day: witness the skeptical
opposition to the AFP's modernization plans. But there is one big difference:
no one views the Army as a joke any more; the AFP, to many people, is no
laughing matter. Praetorian guards, with their ambition and capacity to
overthrow leaders, never are.